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II. Foreign exchange bottleneck
The concept of a foreign exchange bottleneck is a simple ex ante planning concept and has no intrinsic relationship (as we will shortly demonstrate) to the ex post payments deficit concepts. As developed in the planning literature, it essentially amounts to arguing that, given the objective function and domestic resources-cum-technology of the planners, their inability to transform available into demanded goods is the effective constraint on increasing the value of this objective function.
The classic statement of a foreign exchange bottleneck is in a simple corn-tractor model. The economy produces corn, saves and exports corn to import tractors which constitute investment and produce the corn. In this economy, let the current objective be to increase investment. This means buying more tractors from abroad. Now, if the finance minister cannot tax the economy into saving more corn, to purchase more tractors by exporting this corn, then the economy has a savings bottleneck. However, if the *Thanks are due to the National Science Foundation Grants No. SOC77-07254 and No. SOC77-07188 for financial support of the first and second authors respectively, in writing this paper. Thanks are due to Franklyn Holzman and Peter Neary for extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
'Two examples of the latter are Holzman (1978) , who analyzes why the CPEs run into payment deficits, and Desai (1978) , who constructs and estimates a simple Swan-Solow model of the Soviet Union to calculate the social productivity of foreign credits to the Soviet Union, while considering conceptually also the foreign exchange bottleneck that is discussed in the text above. We have profited greatly from reading Holzman (1978) , in writing this paper. economy can be coaxed or taxed into more saving, but the economy faces a unitary price elasticity of demand in the world markets for its corn, foreign exchange receipts will not increase. Tractor imports and therefore investment will not increase; we then have a transformation or foreign exchange bottleneck.2
It will be evident to the reader that a necessary, though not sufficient condition for a foreign exchange bottleneck to exist is-the absence of the economy's ability to transform goods into one another in world markets at the initial world prices. I.e., a "small" country, which is atomistic in world markets, cannot have a foreign exchange bottleneck. [It follows equally that, compared to the free trade situation, such an economy will, for a more general class of objective functions (than merely maximizing the volume of investment), do better by restricting its trade: as is well known from the theory of optimal tariff in the presence of monopoly power in trade.]
In the Soviet context it can be argued that the foreign exchange bottleneck operates not with respect to growth of income, but rather with respect to a shift towards greater availability of consumer goods in total and in composition.
This argument of foreign resource inflow being a constraint on the growth and diversification of consumption levels is best illustrated by reference to the classical and idealized demonstration of the foreign exchange bottleneck for developing countries in Fig. 1 .
Assume there that the economy, at the relevant point of time, has a production possibility vector, P: i.e., resources cannot be transferred from one sector to another.3 Let the two sectors be producing capital and consumer goods respectively a la the standard two-sector model. For the developing countries traditionally, the argument of the developmental planners during the 1950s and 1960s was that a foreign exchange bottleneck existed for raising investment (i.e., availability of capital goods) and growth of income. For, starting from P, the foreign offer curve facing them was PQR and if the developing countries could save more than PW, say PN, the incremental ex ante savings worth NW would not yield any incremental imports of capital goods and hence there would be no increase in ex post investment. NW worth of consumer goods, saved by the developing coun- The Soviet Union's present situation, on the other hand, may be idealized in this illustration by turning the dilemma on its head. With its objective of shifting availabilities in favor of consumer goods, the foreign exchange constraint for the Soviet Union would seem to imply a willingness, but not the ability (beyond PW' of capital goods) to transform capital goods' into consumer goods through foreign exchange earnings with foreign offer curve PQ'R'. The foreign exchange constraint of the Soviet Union, therefore, is indeed, as with developing countries, on shifting the availabilities between investment and consumption through trade. However, in the case of the developing countries, this translated into a constraint on growth of income; in the case of the Soviet Union, it amounts rather to a constraint on the composition of the growing income.6
Open payments deficit
In contrast to the ex ante planning concept of the foreign exchange bottleneck, the payments deficit concepts relate to the ex post macroeconomic situation. ' The idealized treatment of the Soviet economy in Fig. 1 may appear unrealistic to the reader who knows that the Soviet Union exports mainly raw materials such as ores, timber, oil and gas, and chemicals such as potash and ammonia. This worry can be laid to rest by thinking of exports at the margin, as in fact we need to do here; and then it is readily seen that Fig. 1 is close enough to reality. Thus, recall that Soviet machinery exports are widely referred to in the Sovietological literature as "soft exports" whereas exports of raw materials beyond current levels appear infeasible owing to supply, rather than demand, difficulties. 6 We may note explicitly that the argument in the text assumes that wage goods availability will not constrain the growth of Soviet income. For "flow" current-account deficits, it is evident that an open payments deficit means that imports exceed exports ex post. Therefore we can amend the illustration in Fig. 1 to portray an open deficit simply as in Fig. 2 . There, the production possibility curve is TT; production is at P; the world price line, identical with the domestic price line, is APD; the domestic expenditure line is BCE and the national income line is APD, so that the open deficit is AB (if measured in units of consumer goods) or equivalently DE (if measured in units of capital goods).7 With the consumption vector chosen at C, the deficit is "absorbed" as PQ of consumer goods and CQ of capital goods.
Note two things. First, unlike the foreign exchange bottleneck concept which hinges critically on the assumption of monopoly power in trade, an open payments deficit can arise obviously regardless of whether the country is atomistic or not in world markets. Second, it is possible for such an open payments deficit to arise in several alternative ways. Holzman's (1978) 7The equivalence of world and domestic prices, and the tangency of the latter with TI, are simplifying assumptions and can be relaxed without affecting anything essential in the argument in the text, of course.
interesting recent paper in fact argues that CPEs have a built in tendency to get into payments difficulties because they systematically either overestimate export earnings or overestimate production/income. Drawing on these two ideas, we will illustrate precisely some (but by no means all) of the ways in which CPEs may actually experience open payments deficits.
A. Demand-determined open deficit
First, consider cases where the CPE overestimates export performance, not because of supply difficulties but because of unduly optimistic assessment of world demand for its exports, but sticks to its import targets instead of revising them downwards. The resulting (world-) demand-determined open deficit may be illustrated for two polar cases: (i) where the export quantity is forecast accurately but the price is overestimated; and (ii) where the export price is forecast accurately, but the quantity is overestimated.
(i) In Fig. 3(a) , the first case is illustrated. The CPE plans ex ante for PQ exports in exchange for QC imports. However, the terms of trade turn out to be PE instead of PC. Thus the planned and actual exports PQ pay for only QE imports. With planned imports sticky at QC, the CPE then has to run an open payments deficit of CE. The effective social budget line then is RCS and exceeds the income line PE by the deficit.
Note that the "adjustment mechanism" postulated here allows for the disequilibrium resulting from the ex post deterioration in export prices relative to ex ante expectations to be eliminated by external borrowing or running down of reserves and without permitting reallocation of consumption and production decisions so as to maximize some objective function subject to the constraints constituted by domestic transformation and ex post foreign transformation possibilities and borrowing stipulated at CE.8 (ii) In Fig. 3(b) , we illustrate the other polar case where the quantity of exports is overestimated and falls short of PQ by QQ', whereas their price and hence the terms of trade are correctly anticipated as PEC. Exporting PQ' however will pay only for Q'E imports, thus leaving a payments deficit of C'E to pay for the planned and actual imports CQ = C'Q'.'
B. Supply-determined open deficit
Consider next a situation where the failure in export performance comes from an overly optimistic assessment of production of exportables.
(i) Then, assuming that the CPE is atomistic in world markets and can trade as much as it wants to, let P, be the expected production vector and Pa the actual ex post production vector, so that PaPe measures the shortfall in exportable production. PeQ and QS represent the planned exports and imports respectively. If expenditure is not revised downwards a la Holzman (1978), expenditure and income will diverge by SR, which will constitute the open deficit. However, depending on what the planners choose to export in face of the production shortfall, the import level (but not the deficit) will vary; and it can differ from the ex ante level QS. In Fig. 4 , if the shortfall in exportable production leads the planners to a fully offsetting reduction in (total) exports from PeQ to PaQ, the CPE will wind up importing altogether SQ, the planned level of imports. On the other hand, if part of the shortfall in exportable production is accommodated through reduced domestic availability, exports will not be reduced as much. Thus, if they fall, not to PaQ but to PaQ', the payments deficit will remain the same (for it equals the postulated excess of expenditure over income) but the actual import level will rise to Q'S' (>QS).
(ii) But we can tell an altogether different story, reflecting a different "adjustment mechanism." So far, we have argued with Holzman (1978) that the excess of expenditure over income is fixed by the assumption that anticipated expenditure is necessarily ex post expenditure while ex post income falls below anticipated income, and therefore that the trade decisions must accommodate to yield consistency with this. Rather, assume now that it is domestic expenditure that will adjust to accommodate the trade decisions.
Thus, in Fig. 4 , assume that the planners react to the shortfall in exportable production by reducing exports from PeQ to PatQ'. The planned level of imports is sticky at SQ. Then R'H is clearly the level of imports that cannot be financed from export earnings. These imports then imply a corresponding, open payments deficit: a deficit in this instance that is smaller than under the Holzman (1978) assumptions: HR'< S'R' (= SR).
In conclusion, note that the supply-determined open payments deficit can equally arise from shortfall in importable production. Thus the planned exports QPe, when effected, will yield in Fig. 5 the anticipated imports QR.
But PPa, the shortfall in importable production, implies a shortfall then in domestic availability of RS importables which may lead to an open payments deficit of identical magnitude to eliminate this shortfall.
IV. Suppressed payments deficit
In contrast to the open payments deficit, no matter what precise circumstances cause and shape it, the suppressed payments deficit characterizes a situation where these same circumstances are not permitted to "spill over" into the balance of payments in the shape of an excess of imports over exports.
In the case of market economies, this distinction between open and suppressed payments deficits is quite important for analytical purposes. For, a suppressed deficit implies essentially that, instead of maintaining the balance between expenditure and income by a suitable mix of macroeconomic policies which preserves unified exchange rates, and similarly in contrast to the open deficit situation which also permits the preservation of unified exchange rates, the suppressed deficit situation typically implies differential, effective exchange rates on foreign transactions. This is seen in the traditional foreign-exchange-market diagram in Fig. 6 . There, the exchange rate r* corresponds to an equilibrium, unified exchange rate that clears the market. The exchange rate F, leads to an excess demand for foreign exchange that could be met by an open deficit, financed by borrowing or use of reserves, of amount QR: this situation also yielding identical, unified exchange rates for export and import transactions (which underlie the supply and demand curves respectively). However, when the open deficit is suppressed, the exchange rate Fe generates supply of foreign exchange iFQ which is cleared in the market at the "premium-inclusive" price, or effective exchange rate, Fm; and therefore the effective exchange rates on exports (Fe) and on imports (Fm) are unequal in this suppressed-deficit situation. tariff (implying a higher effective exchange rate on imports than on exports) solution for the suppressed deficit case. The "suppressed deficit" concept therefore permits us to examine explicitly the alllocational implications of managing the balance of payments, not by adjusting the exchange rate (and therewith the domestic and foreign residents' transactions), but by pegging the exchange rate and using exchange controls to equate import payments to exchange earnings.
Thus, aside from the obvious fact that an open payments deficit and a suppressed deficit differ because the open deficit implies increased current availability of resources to the economy, the open deficit also is characterized by an adjustment mechanism that ensures, ceteris paribus, unified exchange rates whereas the suppressed deficit does not. For CPEs, however, the latter distinction is not particularly relevant in view of the general delinking of the foreign payments situation from domestic production and consumption decisions. Thus, for the case illustrated in Fig. 3(a) , the open deficit situation was not based on either steady-state optimality or even short-run optimality (given the production decision). The corresponding suppressed deficit situation again, if shown by winding up at E (implying that the imports take the entire adjustment burden), would not generally represent an optimal situation either. The distinction between open and suppressed deficits is therefore unlikely to be of the same significance for CPEs as it is regarded for the analysis of market economies: the welfare implications for resource allocation of these alternative situations are not as clear for the CPEs as they are for the market economies."01 Columbia University Massachusetts Institute of Technology
